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When Less is More: Selection Problems in Large-N 
and Small-N Cross-national Comparisons1 
Bernhard Ebbinghaus 
In recent years, important debates over epistemological and methodological issues 
in comparative cross-national research arose. Proponents of a statistical perspective 
criticize the use of small-N comparison (Lieberson 1991; King/Keohane/Verba 
1994; Goldthorpe 1997), while various comparativists have responded to this criti-
cism, emphasizing the importance of case-oriented studies and shortcomings of 
quantitative approaches (Mahoney/Rueschemeyer 2003; Brady/Collier 2004). A 
major issue has been the attributed ›selection bias‹ of qualitative comparative studies 
(Geddes 1990), in this view, the selection of cases based on their positive outcome 
leads to false inference. However, as I will show, there are also selection problems 
with large-N comparisons. In this paper, I want to revisit the problem of case selec-
tion in comparative research: How do we select our cases for comparative cross-
national analysis? I will focus on cross-national comparison, be it cross-sectional statis-
tical analysis or cross-case logical comparison, referring to ›cases‹ in the sense of po-
litically defined macro-social units, that is independent national states.  
In this paper, I exclude within case analyses that inform much of comparative 
small-N studies (Mahoney 2003) as well as comparative multi-level analyses, which 
use micro-level data and control for cross-national institutional variations by using 
macro variables (Przeworski/Sprague 1986). I also pass over a discussion of Gal-
ton’s problems posed by increased transnationalisation (Ebbinghaus 1998). In the 
following, I first review some of the main selection problems and other short-
comings in quantitative large-N statistical analysis. In a second step, I rebut some of 
the voiced criticism and point at the advantages of qualitative small-N comparison. 
As empirical illustration, I will use some examples from cross-national studies of 
modern welfare states, limiting the set of countries mainly to the OECD countries 
for pragmatic reasons. 
—————— 
 1  Gekürzte Version des auf Englisch erschienen Beitrags: Bernhard Ebbinghaus (2005), »When Less is 
More: Selection Problems in Large-N and Small-N Cross-national Comparisons«, International So-
ciology, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 133–152. 
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1. Selection Problems of Large-N Comparisons 
1.1 The Illusion of Random Sampling 
Statistical inferences based on (random) samples of the population are well estab-
lished, yet it remains doubtful whether we can speak of a ›random sample‹ in cross-
national comparison. First of all, it is often difficult to define the »population at 
risk«, that is the full set of all cases due to divergent (often politically loaded) defini-
tions of what constitutes a nation-state, a region or other social entity. While de-
scriptive statistics should be applied to the description of a given population, infer-
ence statistics should be confined to inferences from a random sample to the 
population of cases. Yet »many economists and political scientists will even perform 
statistical tests that assume a random sample, when the units of analysis at their 
disposal mount up to the complete population.« (Pennings/Keman/Kleinnijenhuis 
1999: 82). Several rationales are given for the ›attraction‹ of statistical tests: (1) the 
non-random country sample is taken as the best approximation of the full universe 
of cases, (2) it helps dealing with (random) measurement errors, (3) that there is an 
infinity of models that could be applied to the same evidence, and (4), a ›metaphysi-
cal‹ claim that a selected set represents a sample from the unknown universe of past, 
present and future cases. All these claims are questionable since the cases at hand 
are themselves preselected not least by historical processes.  
In practice, variable-oriented researchers choose a set of cases for largely prag-
matic reasons: cultural familiarity, similar socio-economic development and – last 
but not least – availability of data. Instead of a random sample, cross-national stud-
ies are commonly dealing with a (non-random) sample from a categorical set. Moreo-
ver, data availability is unequally distributed across potential cases: macro-indicators 
and time-series are more likely to be available for the more advanced economies, 
larger societies and long-term democracies, in particular if they are members of 
international organizations such as the OECD or Eurostat that collect and dissemi-
nate such data-series. 
1.2 The Stratified ›Sample‹ Problem  
In contrast to a population census, the cases of a macro-comparison are heteroge-
neous social units, violating the homogeneity assumption of inferential statistics. 
Given the large cross-national differences in population and economic resources, it 
may be misleading to analyze each case as equally important. The most common 
›fix‹ to this problem is to apply statistical controls for measuring (otherwise unob-
served) heterogeneity, including population or resource variables as controls in a 
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regression model. However, adding control variables will reduce the degree of free-
dom considerably in cases where cross-country analysis are based on few countries 
and might limit the explanatory power of other independent variables in case of 
multicolinearity. 
The alternative strategy sometimes undertaken is to reduce heterogeneity by se-
lecting countries with similar conditions (e.g. advanced industrial countries) or by 
agnostically assuming similarity due to membership in a particular dataset (e.g. 
OECD). Both strategies have major repercussions in descriptive and inference 
statistics. Hence, there are two problems that cross-sectional analysis faces: (1) the 
population of macro-units is very heterogeneous, contradicting the homogeneity 
assumption, and (2) any selection hereof be it for size or categorical membership, 
will have considerable impact on dependent and independent variables (selection bias). 
These problems cannot be remedied by better (or larger) sampling, but are prob-
lems resulting from the historical contingency of real world macro-social units. 
1.3 The Historical Contingency Problem  
When selection is based on a regional (e.g. Southern Europe), categorical (e.g. Social 
democratic welfare states) or organizational membership (e.g. EU), the ›population‹ 
of real world cases is ›biased‹ as a result of historical and political contingencies. 
Choosing the members of a political organization (e.g. EU) implies ›self-selection‹ 
by historical or political processes since accession is contingent on fulfilling admis-
sion criteria, political decisions by the applicant, and the admission by the interna-
tional organization. Even when we use regional or categorical sets or for that matter 
all existing countries, the universe of cases is ›biased‹. Today’s observable national 
states are a highly contingent set of (surviving and redesigned) cases. Yet all 
observable cases represent only a ›limited diversity‹ (Ragin 1987) compared to the 
many more logical possibilities.  
1.4 The Path-Dependency Problem  
In the search for increasing degrees of freedom, quantitative researchers have em-
braced time-series and more recently cross-sectional (or ›pooled‹) time-series analy-
sis (Beck 2001). Yet general linear models applied in quantitative studies face a 
problem related to path dependence. Stanley Lieberson called this problem 
asymmetrical forms of causation (Lieberson 1985: Ch. 4). This comes very close to 
the increasing returns of a path dependent phenomenon (Arthur 1994). Hence, the 
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selection of an appropriate time window is an additional important consideration in 
comparative research. 
2. Deliberate Selection in Small-N Case Study 
2.1 Comparison and Single Case Studies 
For many critics, a single case study is of very limited value to comparative analysis 
since it is neither directly comparative, nor does it allow to generalize beyond the 
case. Yet depending on the selection, in-depth study of a single case can in fact 
make a contribution to our general knowledge, it can »make a case« (Gerring 2001): 
an extreme case that clarifies the outlier of previous statistical analysis; a typical case that 
stands for a larger set of countries; a crucial case that approaches most clearly the 
paradigmatic case of a particular theory; a counterfactual case that is a theoretical com-
parison of what might have happened with what actually did. The case study pur-
pose can thus be manifold: a particular case can confirm, disprove, alter or generate 
a theory (Lijphart 1971; Collier 1991). Certainly, the scientific process cannot stop 
here, the amended or new theory should then be applied to other cases; the single 
case study then plays only a part in a larger collective enterprise that may well re-
quire to be more interdisciplinary and international (Smelser 2003). 
2.2 »Too Many Variables, too Few Cases« Problem 
The most common criticism of the comparative method is the »many variables, 
small N problem« (Lijphart 1971: 686; Goldthorpe 1997): there are just too few 
cases to allow the testing of all potentially relevant variables. In statistical language, 
we face a »degree of freedom« problem, though this implies that we wish to test a 
large number of variables at the same time. However, as I would argue, comparison 
may serve a different function, namely to test a proposition with a few given vari-
ables, and this makes the too-many-variables problem less pertinent. Hence, one 
particular case suffices to disconfirm a theory unless we face severe measurement 
problems on dependent or independent variables (see below).  
Only when we shift from deductive proposition testing to induction do we face 
the small-N problem. Indeed, there are always too many potential, nontrivial inde-
pendent variables that could be considered. It is indeed true that Mill’s inductive 
cannon of logic cannot be used to infer causal relationships other than about neces-
sary conditions, except in the unlikely case that we could indeed control all other 
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relevant variables by selection of appropriate cases. Thus, the comparative method, 
in combination with the appropriate selection of cases, can provide a means to test 
propositions deduced from a given theory or may help to eliminate some competing 
hypotheses. Here, the number of cases is not the limiting factor for the variables, 
but the conflict between predicted and actual outcome. 
2.3 The Selection by Outcome Bias  
Another criticism voiced against small-N studies is the »selection bias« problem, 
that is a violation of a methodological rule from statistical analysis (Geddes 1990; 
King/Keohane/Verba 1994): when we deliberately exclude cases with high (or low) 
values of the dependent variables, the statistical results are biased compared to the 
full set of observations. Barbara Geddes points at two problems:  
»The first (...) involves jumping to the conclusion that any characteristic that the selected cases 
share is a cause. The other involves assuming that a relationship (or the absence of a relationship) 
between variables within the selected set of cases reflect relationships in the entire population of 
cases« (1990: 132f.).  
Geddes criticism, that by adding more observations to an extensive bivariate analy-
sis the linear relationship might change seems unfair to the work of those who study 
the social processes in a few cases intensively and make no claim beyond the cases 
at hand. 
While the large-N researchers seem to hope that the more cases they study the 
more ground they have to generalize their findings beyond the observed cases, quali-
tative comparative methods usually lead to more complex findings when the num-
ber of cases is increased. With each new case we learn more about whether a uni-
versal relationship holds or whether we have to add further conditional factors to its 
applicability. The basic selection questions, which categorical set is the right one 
depends on the availability of cases, our in-depth knowledge about them, their 
comparability and their theoretical relevance.  
The more serious challenge is the first problem mentioned by Geddes, the 
problem of causality. According to Mill’s logic of agreement, we would need a most 
dissimilar country design (MDSO) when all selected cases show the same outcome, 
that is, all independent variables should differ in all but the crucial variable. By se-
lecting on the outcome, however, we can only establish necessary causes, this is claim 
that all cases share the same preconditions and that further (unclear) causal mecha-
nisms are at stake. The selection by outcome allows us not only to find some po-
tential necessary conditions but it provides a means to eliminate all those potential 
variables that are always (or in most cases) not congruent with a positive outcome.  
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Again the flag of »too few cases for too many variables« is waved. It will probably 
be impossible to single out the one causal necessary condition, and some of the 
congruent observations may be trivial and some may be spurious factors. Again, 
theoretical considerations and additional evidence will be needed to distinguish 
between true, trivial and spurious necessary conditions. However, the most impor-
tant contribution of selection by outcome is that this method can help to eliminate 
some non-necessary conditions in a first step. For those who refute that finding 
necessary conditions is enough to establish causality, this is certainly not enough.  
2.4 Deterministic Causality 
A fundamental difference in epistemological and ontological positions turns around 
the controversy over deterministic vs. probabilistic causality (Lieberson 1991; 
Goldthorpe 1997). Small-N comparison, using Mill’s logic or Boolean algebra, are 
criticized as ›deterministic‹ since already one case can falsify a proposition, thus 
ignoring the possibility of chance events, the frequency of (dis)confirming cases, 
and likelihood of measurement errors. In contrast, a probabilistic model would 
entail an ontological view that social processes are stochastic, the statistical law of 
large numbers, and the natural distribution modelling of measurement errors. Stan-
ley Lieberson (1991; 1994), among other critics of the ›deterministic‹ comparative 
logic, argues for a probabilistic model given the complexity of social processes. 
When there are complex multivariate causes at work, social science is unable to 
measure, control or model all relevant factors and interactions, particularly not in a 
small-N research design. Certainly in larger small-N studies, using Boolean com-
parative methods, we may be able to go beyond Mill’s one factor perspective and 
also include interactive configurational analysis (Ragin 1987).  
Most fundamentally, there may be unmeasured chance events and unaccount-
able stochastic processes that intervene in the real life social processes and can thus 
only be captured by probabilistic statements. »Except for probabilistic situations 
that approach 1 or 0 (in other words, those that are almost deterministic), studies 
based on a small number of cases have difficulty in evaluating probabilistic theories« 
(Lieberson 1991: 310). However, this criticism does not hold for necessary condi-
tions, which should be present in all those cases that lead to an outcome partly due 
to intervening chance events. We may not be able to study the stochastic process 
itself by ›deterministic‹ comparative methods; yet necessary auxiliary conditions 
could still be analyzed. Furthermore, stochastic processes could be studied by within-
case analyses (for instance, analyzing several events over time) the results of which 
could then be analyzed across cases using comparative methods. 
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2.5 Frequency and Historical Contingency 
A way to circumvent the hard deterministic test, frequency considerations can be 
used in the qualitative comparative analysis, particularly in medium-N studies. 
»Rather than impose absolute standards in all investigations (...), researchers also 
can make inferences about sufficiency using probabilistic methods« (Ragin 2000: 
109). Indeed, Charles Ragin’s fuzzy set approach allows for assessing probabilistic 
propositions of ›quasi-sufficiency‹, applying formal statistical (binominal) test with 
predefined benchmarks. Already few confirming cases may thus be enough to pass 
a statistical test. Similarly Bayesian estimators of the confidence in a hypothesis 
could be used. As Douglas Dion suggests: »in determining whether a necessary 
condition is true, we must compare the hypothesis that the necessary condition is at 
work to some alternative that the necessary condition is not at work« (1998: 134). 
Using for instance a prior probability of 50 percent that the alternative hypothesis is 
correct, only five confirming cases are needed to reach a 95 percent confidence that 
a condition is indeed necessary (Dion 1998). 
Finally, we also face the problem of »limited diversity« (Ragin 1987) due to his-
torical contingency. Many master variables ›band‹ together, thus the universalist 
Nordic welfare states are all ›smaller‹ export-oriented, Protestant and homogenous 
societies, with relatively successful left parties and powerful unions. Moreover, not 
all logically possible configurations of master variables have occurred (thus far) and 
therefore we cannot test alternative combinations with real world observations. This 
»limited diversity« has major implications for Boolean configurational analysis since 
the outcome of non-existing combinations is unknown. Boolean analysis can be 
used to reveal the implicit simplifying assumptions about non-existing cases (Ragin 
1987: 104–113). Historical contingency also sets some limits for frequency consid-
erations in fuzzy set analysis. If we set our frequency level for example to four out 
of five cases, it would depend on historical nation-building contingency whether 
enough cases could be found to meet the benchmark. Nevertheless, frequency 
related qualitative comparison allows researchers to evaluate the probability within 
particular configurations and thus circumvent the pitfall of assuming linear relation-
ship across cases that are asymmetrically distributed due to historically contingent 
nation-building. 
3. Conclusion 
The two juxtaposed research approaches certainly have both advantages and disad-
vantages. The analysis of selection problems in comparative studies indicates several 
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pitfalls, some of which are peculiar to macro-level analysis whether quantitative or 
qualitative. Most fundamentally, the universe of macro-social units from which we 
choose our cases is highly contingent, and itself an outcome of historical and politi-
cal processes. These contingencies are not always well understood and unfortu-
nately not often explicitly reflected by cross-national studies. The danger is that 
quantitative researchers want to analyze the available data and test their hypotheses 
too quickly, instead of explicitly discussing why and how their cases came to be in 
their ›sample‹. Availability of data and past research leads them to a ›let’s take what 
we have‹ approach in case selection. This stands in contrast to the explicit deliberate 
selection of cases following the qualitative comparative method that seeks to choose 
cases with a view to particular theory-relevant configurations. Cases are selected 
because they are most similar or most dissimilar, with important consequences for 
the kind of causal inferences that can be tested.  
It is problematic that quantitative studies use inference statistics as if the cases 
are a quasi-random sample, but instead it is usually a relatively stratified set of cases. 
Any grouping of national states is a historically contingent set, implying consider-
able problems for cross-national statistical inference. The practice of steering 
around these issues by introducing statistical control variables seems a rather unsat-
isfying research strategy. This is not to rule out the use of quantitative methods 
altogether, but rather to call for more modesty in its use and implications. Statistical 
analysis can play a role in data exploration, yet there remain major obstacles to 
inference from any given ›sample‹ of national states to the (implied) universe of all 
macro-social units. 
Much of the criticism of the small-N approach seems to be derived from a mis-
leading analogy based on statistical methodological reasoning and considerable 
misunderstandings about the purpose of cross-case comparison. The comparative 
method cannot be reduced to the exercise of logical truth-table analysis only, but is 
built upon the insights from within-case analysis such as detailed historical study of 
the underlying social processes that stand behind macro-variables. A probabilistic 
perspective can be partially integrated through frequency benchmarks, while sto-
chastic processes can be assessed through within-case-analysis. Moreover, the small-
N configurational analysis is better suited to take into account the historical and 
political contingency of macro-social units, as it allows for configurational analysis, 
while the selection of cases is informed by the strategy to control for much real 
world diversity and similarity. Given the strong supporting evidence of path de-
pendent developments, comparative analysis that engages in a dialogue between 
within-case analysis and configurational comparison seem to me to be more appro-
priate than those cross-national statistical analyses that assume homogeneity, inde-
pendence and representativeness of its cases. 
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